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Memes and narrative analysis: A potential direction for the development of neo-Darwinian 
orientated research in organisations. 
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Abstract 
A number of authors have contributed to a diverse range of views concerning the possibility 
of evolutionary processes acting in organisations. Theories based on a self replicating 
cultural equivalent to the gene posit the 'meme' as the cultural replicator. A review of the 
memetic literature as part of study towards PhD empirical work has highlighted a lack of 
consensus in the memetic literature leading to difficulties in deciding on a method for 
operationalising research questions. The article describes how a dependence on the gene 
analogy, associated with much memetic knowledge, has led to unrecognised assumptions 
which are carried into memetic accounts of culture and identifies unresolved philosophical 
dilemmas. To achieve progress beyond the limited existing memetic empirical research a 
move to mainstream social science method is suggested in the form of narrative analysis. 
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Background and Introduction 
 
This paper is based on literature reviewed as part of my PhD study which investigates the 
possibility of designing a memetic approach to understanding the organisational culture of a 
small UK printing firm. I had originally approached the subject of memes from a starting 
perspective which was sympathetic to the value of the meme concept as a potential 
explanatory theory of culture but in searching for a rigorous methodology for empirical work, 
which could satisfy the needs of the PhD examination criteria, my viewpoint has become 
progressively more sceptical. Here, I describe how working with the memetic literature has 
led to my abduction of one potential empirical method which is inferred in the literature. 
 
My background in organisations has been largely based in the sales and marketing 
functions of firms. However, having spent twenty years in industry I had reached the 
conclusion that much of what constitutes the body of marketing knowledge i.e. that which 
appears as the contents of most mainstream marketing textbooks is, at best, difficult to 
implement in the workplace and at worst, of no practical use as a method of day to day 
working. In fact, such marketing theory had begun to seem weak when pitted against 
alternative organisational orientations/functions such as production or finance, for example. 
 
My interest in memes began when I read the theory of the selfish gene (Dawkins, 
1976; 1989) during my time working in the print industry. The theory in biology made 
intuitive sense to me and I was intrigued by the suggestion that culture might have a similar 
underpinning evolutionary dynamic which could perhaps offer a refreshing alternative view 
of how life in an organisation may play itself out. My experience of the repetition of working 
practices, routines and workplace terminology seemed to lend plenty of anecdotal evidence 
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for repeating or even replicating pieces of culture and I remember, in particular, being struck 
by how I could enter an open plan office humming a tune and then hear the tune repeated 
back from a colleague a little later. I was motivated to investigate the possibility of memes in 
organisations and made the work the basis of my PhD.  
 
In this paper, I summarise some of my insights which followed a review of the 
memetics literature and I suggest how a potential methodological approach might be 
designed.  I return briefly to the basic principles of replication which underpin Richard 
Dawkins‟ description of biological evolution and then discuss the subsequent attempts to 
apply the same concept to culture via memes. However, it is my contention; having reviewed 
the various facets of the literature, that the theoretical development of memes has not been 
accompanied by sufficient empirical research for such a long period of time that the degree of 
variation in the theory means an empirical study design is not straightforward. Many 
assumptions are built in to the alternative stories of memes and they cannot all be accounted 
for at once. However, a critical review of the literature has revealed some assumptions which 
I feel should be ruled out of an initial empirical investigation thereby increasing, the chance of 
such a methodology becoming a sufficiently widely accepted approach within the social 
sciences to encourage and enable further empirical work and in turn more valid reflections on 
the theory. 
 
Finding Replicators 
 
In „The Selfish Gene‟ (Dawkins 1976; 1989) and later in „The Extended Phenotype‟ 
(Dawkins, 1982; 1999a) Richard Dawkins outlines a replicator orientated view of biological 
life where the gene is the replicator in question. The theory posits the perspective that all such 
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life is the product of a blind evolutionary algorithm which operates because genes evolve 
complex life as a result of the natural selection of some genes over others. The organisms 
which have emerged are no more than the survival machines/strategy combinations which the 
genes have discovered through trial and error in the environment they populate. The selection 
mechanism is that of differential survival and reproduction of organisms which results in 
differential survival and replication of the genes that built the organisms. 
 
Having elevated the gene to a starring role in his story of evolution, Dawkins 
speculated about the assumed primacy of genes as the sole type of replicators influencing life 
on Earth, by postulating how an alternative replicator may also be making copies of itself via 
a separate but similar process of evolution leading, in turn, to an alternative complexity. The 
replicator suggested to „cut the gene down to size‟ (Dawkins, 1999b) was a replicator that 
could explain those aspects of human behaviour which stretch beyond explanations based 
wholly on genetics, i.e. those behaviours which constitute human culture. 
 
Memetic Theorising 
 
Having suggested this hypothetical replicator and named it the „meme‟ (Dawkins, 
1976) a number of writers, who presumably like me intuitively appreciated the clarity of the 
concept, were inspired to construct their visions of how such a replicator may manifest a 
system of evolved cultural phenomena and how the process and its products may explain 
human cultures and how we experience them. These visions, notably Blackmore (1999), 
Dennett (1991), Aunger (2002), Brodie (1996), Lynch (1996), Distin (2005) have been 
accompanied by a number of applied versions of the theory, some related to organisations. 
For example, Price and Shaw (1998) develop an explanation of how the cultural patterns 
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experienced in organisations could be construed as the product of memes and Weeks and 
Galunic (2003) suggest the organisational form known as the „firm‟ could be the product of a 
successful complex of memes. However, none of the above studies are based on primary 
empirical research. Rather, it is the usual practice to selectively pick examples from culture to 
help illustrate how memes may work and therefore convenient memes tend to be invoked to 
help description rather than candidates for real memes discovered in their cultural settings. 
 
Despite a lack of the primary empirical evidence for memes which would usually be 
characteristic of both valid theory building and testing (Gill and Johnson, 2002), the field of 
study which links memes and culture has come to be known as memetics, thereby assuming in 
language at least, the status of a scientific discipline. Of course, genetics provides a 
mainstream sister science and those who have written on the subject of memetics lean heavily 
on genetic analogy for ideas, metaphor and validity. The notion of universal Darwinism 
(Dennett, 1995) lends this practice legitimacy. For example, Distin (2005) searches for 
cultural DNA, Brodie (1996), Dawkins (1993) and Lynch (1996) warn of viruses and 
contagion of the mind and Blackmore (2010) refers to cultural evolution as the offspring of a 
biological species. In spite of the paucity of empirical evidence those exploring the theoretical 
aspects of memes have not been deterred from progressively adding to theory. For example, 
for Blackmore (1999; 2010) anything which people copy constitutes a meme. Based on this 
assumption Blackmore (2010) has invoked yet another replicator which is enabled by the 
success of the memes, the teme, or a unit of information which is copied by technology alone 
without the need for directly using the human brain for transmission.  
 
Problems with Memetic Theorising 
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The lack of empirical pruning of memetic theory has led to wide variation in the body 
of memetic theory maintained by, in some cases, the rather glib truth claims, such as 
Blackmore‟s naively empirically circular argument mentioned above. Such arguments are 
eschewed by mainstream social science, cognisant of the reflexive nature of social knowledge 
(Johnson and Duberley, 2000). The resulting mass of unsubstantiated theory, in place of 
empirically demonstrated research findings, means there is no obvious methodology for the 
would-be memetic field researcher to adopt, especially a researcher who wishes to not assume 
the existence of memes at the outset of their investigations. 
 
The variation in theoretical standpoints in the memetics literature can be illustrated by 
reviewing the different assumptions regarding human agency. Such basic assumptions 
obviously have major implications for the ontological and epistemological underpinning of 
truth claims (Johnson and Duberley, ibid) and there is a huge body of knowledge concerning 
issues of consciousness, self and agency which is yet to be integrated with memetics in a 
significant manner. See Leary and Price Tangney (2003) for a summary. 
 
The scope for argument related to agency can be traced back to Dawkins' original 
explication of the meme concept. Dawkins (1976) suggests that selfishness is the defining 
characteristic amongst replicating entities such as genes and memes. Therefore, the concept 
can be taken from genes, where the gene is portrayed as the ultimate selfish entity bent only 
on its own replication, and applied to culture. Dawkins (1991) clearly rules out any design in 
biology and subsequently bases his ideas concerning memes directly on the gene analogy 
rather than the selective cultural examples he cites as potentially memetic. 
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 “Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to 
body via sperm or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping 
from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation.” 
(Dawkins, 1989, p192) 
 
So, the trend is set for basing memetic theorising on the gene analogy but from the 
outset unsubstantiated elements have been carried forward from biology. In referring to 
sexual reproduction, which is an evolved trait of some genes, genetic replicating machinery is 
carried forward to memes. There is no reason to expect that a cultural replicator would evolve 
the same sexual replicating machinery. Also, and perhaps fatally for memes, the selfish 
replicator concept is diluted for memes because Dawkins suggests people can choose their 
memes. This is a major departure from the foundations of the selfish gene where no design is 
countenanced, whatsoever. 
 
To illustrate this further Dawkins' (1976; 1989) original vision of how memes arose 
and how they relate to genes is depicted in figure 1 which shows how genetic evolution led to 
certain animals (in particular, humans) with a brain capable of imitating their conspecifics. 
This genetically enabled survival strategy then enabled units of imitation to occur which 
could compete for recognition/attention in the human brain on the basis of their innate 
attractiveness in some way, i.e. they are replicators. So, a new level of replicator driven 
evolution began based on units such as language, fashion, ceremonies and customs, art, and 
engineering (Dawkins, 1989, p190).  
 
By suggesting that memes arise as soon as the brain can achieve imitation, it should be 
expected that memetic evolution will control people in the same way as genes control the 
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behaviour of animals. There is no obvious scope, in this model of two selfish replicators, for 
human agency. However, Dawkins (1993) later developed his ideas surrounding memes by 
suggesting that they constitute viruses of the mind (not the brain) and the subtle change from 
brain parasite to mind virus which justifies the claim that humans can rebel against their 
memes, goes unrecognised. Here also, the difficulties of applying the gene analogy are 
highlighted because anyone who has ever caught a cold knows that viruses aren‟t limited to 
sperm and egg transmission. Therefore, Dawkins previous analogy used to describe meme 
transmission as similar to sperm and egg is contradicted without critical reflection. The result 
is that assumptions have been built into meme theory.  
 
Of course, the assumption of a mind enables the potential for human agency distinct 
from replicators but once agency occurs memes lose their selfish replicator status and die as a 
cultural equivalent of the gene because they are no longer replicated due to their innate 
qualities. In this case there can be no neo-Darwinian process in culture although other types of 
Darwinian evolution, which are not replicator based, may still occur (Aunger, 2002). Indeed 
Aunger (ibid) criticises Dawkins' examples of memes for this reason and also points to the 
types of measures of meme fecundity Dawkins suggests, such as the number of people 
whistling a tune, as inaccurate ways of measuring the memes inside peoples brains. People 
can know a tune without whistling it. 
 
To accommodate the agency issue with respect to the virus analogy Dawkins (1993) 
invokes two kinds of epidemiology. Firstly, descriptive epidemiology where scientists, for 
example, consciously choose more valid claims to knowledge and secondly, causal 
epidemiology where the memes are responsible for their own spread, for example religion. 
Unfortunately, the claims to validity for this dichotomy have yet to be borne out via the very 
10 
 
scientific method which Dawkins extols. Indeed, Distin (2005) criticises Dawkins for 
applying value judgments to replicators in culture which he is so careful to avoid when 
discussing the impact of genes in biology. 
 
Memes as Viruses 
 
Undeterred by these dilemmas Richard Brodie and Aaron Lynch both developed the 
„meme as virus‟ analogy. Lynch (1996) defines memes as contagious ideas because they are 
so appealing to people they tend to be caught (like a cold) and suggests seven methods of 
transmission. However, the support for these assertions is extremely anecdotal and largely 
limited to parental influence on children and ideas which tend to encourage proselytising 
behaviour. The issue of whether this is due to human agency or memetic replication is not 
engaged with. Brodie (1996) acknowledges the question of agency but only by openly 
presuming no „self‟ along with disavowing any claims to absolute truth, a move to subjectivist 
ontology which is at odds with Dawkins' realist underpinning philosophy of the replicator 
view of life (Dawkins, 1998). So, actually the agency issue is still side stepped in a way which 
undermines any rigorous philosophical grounding of the arguments but in this way Brodie 
(ibid) is still confident enough to suggest memes can be consciously chosen by a person. 
 
“Consciously spreading ideas you consider important is one way to combat mind 
viruses.” (Brodie, 1996, pXX) 
 
In Brodie‟s account memes become viruses only when they are wrongly assumed to 
be true resulting in spurious cause and effect linkages which people believe because of the 
appeal they have to humans‟ genetically inherited predisposition to fight, flee, feed, and find a 
11 
 
mate. Subsequently, another value laden dichotomy is posited, similar to Dawkins' 
epidemiology dualism, where cultural viruses arise naturally and designer viruses are invented 
by people. However, this dichotomy cannot be sustained whilst at the same time the issue of 
agency is ignored because there is no explanation of who does the designating of any 
particular cultural trait as either naturally occurring or designed. Designer viruses also 
threaten the replicator status of memes as recognised by Aunger (2002) because if they can be 
designed then surely they can be consciously chosen. Brodie appears to divide the human 
species into those with agency who can design and choose their memes and those without 
agency that are gullibly infected. Is this a previously unknown genetic distinction or 
something completely new? Brodie suggests that he is capable of free will but how do we 
know he is not just a proselytising meme machine? What a mess!  
 
The virus of the mind approach to memetics highlights the pitfalls of invoking yet to 
be substantiated elements of the genetic/biological analogy in culture. As Distin (2005), in 
rejecting the „meme as virus' model points out, identifying memes as viruses presupposes 
some kind of memetically evolved survival machine and Distin‟s selfish meme theory does 
not allow for any such machinery1. Of course, the paucity of empirical memetic research 
means the existence, or otherwise, of memetic replicating machinery remains an open 
question but a question which is yet to be asked in empirical research. 
 
Addressing the Agency Question 
 
                                                          
1
 Distin (2005) suggests the phenotypes of genes also act as memetic survival machines. 
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Dennett (1991) has recognised the brain/mind dilemma, which is raised by the „meme 
as replicator‟ perspective, as important in memetic theorising and has developed a theory of 
consciousness able to accommodate memes which is modelled in figure 2.  
 
Dennett (ibid) is careful to avoid the virus of the mind perspective by noting that in his 
theory memes parasitize brains rather than minds and that they can be either beneficial, 
tolerable or pernicious to people. The resulting materialistic theory of consciousness2, where a 
„pandemonium‟ of various thoughts and nerve impulses struggle for expression, posits that 
what we comprehend as a serial stream of consciousness is actually a retrospectively 
experienced stream of narrative which was subject to continual editing as the various areas of 
the brain made their contributions.  
 
“At any point in time there are multiple „drafts‟ of narrative fragments at various 
stages of editing in various parts of the brain.” (Dennett, 1991, p113) 
 
This is Dennett‟s 'multiple drafts model' and the various competing pieces of 
information are the memes (Dennett, 1991). 
 
Similarly, Blackmore (1999) addresses the agency question and suggests that a 
minority of memes are pernicious. Rather, the majority of memes should be considered as the 
basic constituents of our minds which have co-evolved with the human genome thereby 
influencing the development of the large human brain and our language ability. 
 
                                                          
2
 Dennett (1991) looks to eliminate any place for unexplained 'mind stuff' in his theory. All mind related 
phenomena must be able to be accounted for by the material which makes up the brain. 
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“Indeed, the vast majority of memes (like the vast majority of genes) cannot be 
considered viral at all – they are the very stuff of our minds. Our memes are who we 
are.” (Blackmore 1999, P22) 
 
However, Blackmore‟s claims must be viewed with scepticism because of the naive 
epistemic circularity with which she justifies the existence of memes and the dependence on 
imitation which is pivotal to her theory but not justified in terms of a demonstrable process. 
 
Dennett (1991, p418) develops his theory by suggesting that the fundamental tactic of 
humans is telling stories and the stories posit a self, a centre of narrative gravity where the 
words of the stories are the memes. However, as part of this model people still need to think 
to enable their memes so space is reserved for free will (Dennett, 2003). Blackmore (1999), 
on the other hand, adapts the narrative centre of gravity concept to suggest we are meme 
machines which experience a „selfplex‟ of memes, the only escape possible being the brief 
glimpses of alternative conscious states via meditation. In this way our library of stories 
which can make itself known through the narrative centre of gravity/selfplex then act as a 
repertoire of strategies for managing the future. Where Brodie assumes a privileged position 
of free will, Blackmore suggests her writing is simply a result of the competition between 
memes which plays out as she types. 
 
“It is more accurate to say that we are just human beings doing complex things 
that need memory and who then construct a story about a self who does the 
remembering.” (Blackmore, 1999, p227) 
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Distin (2005) and Aunger (2002) both develop memetic theory which reserves greater 
degrees of human agency than either Dennett or Blackmore, although the theories are less 
well developed in this respect because the agency issue is not at the heart of the theories. 
Distin (ibid) resorts to the suggestion of innate mind ability and common sense, for example. 
However, it seems clear that empirical work and then the further theorising that it will 
encourage should either address the agency question or at least avoid a naive acceptance of 
replication at the outset. 
 
Criticism of Memetics 
 
The wide range of theoretical perspectives and the subsequent unresolved criticism 
within memetics has made the „discipline‟ an easy target for critique from other social science 
perspectives. For example, Midgley (1979) criticised both the selfish gene and selfish meme 
concepts shortly after Dawkins first published his ideas and despite Dawkins (1981) reply 
which exposes Midgley‟s misunderstanding of the selfishness rhetoric used to demonstrate 
replication3, the points raised about agency are still yet to be answered today despite this 
particular point being later reiterated by Midgely (1983). 
 
Some critique of the fundamentals of memetics can also be heard echoed within the 
memetic community alongside the theoretical disagreements. Aunger (2002) is astonished 
that the failure to find a single meme has not raised alarm bells amongst memeticists and 
Edmonds (2002) suggests that the memetic community should stop the over ambitious 
theoretical discussion, in which it has been indulging, and do some of the mundane footwork 
that will actually advance the knowledge of memetic processes. 
                                                          
3
 Midgley seemingly has a desire to anthropomorphise animals in some way, and this being easier to do at the 
organism level rather than at the level of the gene leads to her inability to consider the replicator concept 
clearly. 
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Three challenges for memetics are posed by Edmonds (ibid). Any empirical work 
towards satisfying these points would presumably constitute the mundane footwork of which 
he speaks. 
1. To provide a conclusive case study that demonstrates a replication mechanism. 
2. To provide a theoretical model for when it is more appropriate to use a 
memetic model.  
3. A simulation model showing the true emergence of a memetic process.  
There are problems with a modelling approach at this stage in the development of 
memetic knowledge. Although there are plenty of theories which could all be modelled, 
because the extant theory is so heavily based on assumptions which would have to be built 
into the models to make them work, they could all show interesting results which are, 
however, devoid of any resemblance to how culture actually happens. 
 
An example of how, a game theoretic,  modelling approach can be applied to the 
meme concept in voting behaviour is provided by Conley, Toossi and Wooders (2006) and 
the reflective nature of the work openly highlights the degree to which variables have to be 
constructed on the assumptions of how replication may or may not work. In addition to this 
the work also includes less apparent assumptions such as a presumed dichotomy between 
rationality and public spiritedness, which is investigated without the acknowledgment of 
wider social discourse effects such as the pressure to vote because democracy 'is a hard won 
human right', for example. In the end the model overtly avoids discriminating between innate 
genetic effects and learnt effects so any appeal to memetics is diluted. 
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Similarly, Vos and Kelleher's (2001) suggestion of four hypotheses for memetic study 
also suffers from the assumption of the existence of memes combined with an inconclusive 
definition of memes based on a combination of Dawkins and Blackmore's meme concepts 
without recognising the associated inconsistencies between the two, for example, the 
brain/mind dilemma which overshadows and undermines such a combination. 
 
In light of this I would suggest that any work on memetic modelling needs to be 
preceded by more fundamental work so the avenue for progress seems to me to be limited to 
the search for instances of replication (Edmonds' point 1) which would support the basic 
validity of the meme idea. Memes are based on the premise of replication, after all. Therefore, 
no assumption of memes can be included in the methodology for memetic empirical work 
because, as yet, memes' existence as replicators is yet to be demonstrated. 
 
Examples of Empirical Research and its Problems 
 
The few examples of memetically orientated empirical research published to date 
suffer from the insecure theoretical foundations discussed above. The following two examples 
illustrate some of the difficulties. 
 
Firstly, Lord and Price (2001) use secondary data gathered from the websites of 
various Christian denominations to conduct a cluster analysis based on traits they attribute to 
the profile of each group. The traits are assumed to be memes. This is then compared to an 
historical account of the development of the religious groups and the clustering is shown to 
match the historical account of their relationships to one another, thereby failing to falsify the 
premise of an underlying memetic explanation. However, the work assumes memes as 
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replicators and the organisations as evolving entities. Despite the assumption of replication 
the choice of religious groupings for the analysis seems to suggest Dawkins' „meme as virus‟ 
perspective and indeed this is supported by the invocation of Dawkins' version of the meme 
concept.  
The assumption of the existence of memes leads to a theory laden sampling of data 
with built in expectations about the heredity of certain groups. There is also a later adjustment 
made to the data to achieve a better fit to the expected outcomes and this is only reflected 
upon from within the assumption of memes existence rather than as a threat to the meme 
concept. Similarly, there is no reporting of the strengths of the associations used for clustering 
but dendrograms are used to report the findings, thereby borrowing credibility from similar 
applications in genetics and the more secure evidence for replication in that sphere. This 
rather overshadows the discussion of whether such approaches should be applied to memetic 
or phenotypic distinctions although the existence of memes as replicators rather than 
theoretical constructions let alone memetic phenotypes has yet to be demonstrated, of course. 
The assumption of replication obfuscates all the other explanations for the changes in 
religious groups. Such changes could be due to people making conscious free decisions about 
how their religion should be practiced or could be the result of church leaders' conscious 
political motives for instigating change. Indeed, Henry VII is endowed with the agency to see 
himself as defender of the faith but the implications of this degree of agency for the research 
in question, is not recognised. It would be more interesting, from a replicator perspective, to 
compare the stated tenets of religious groups with how people actually behave and what they 
individually believe, i.e. the memes in their minds (Aunger, 2002) rather than authored 
accounts. Also, formal accounts such as the historical record and websites, both of which 
could be considered as authored narratives, should be expected to reflect associated content so 
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without the demonstration of replication rather than its invocation there is no reason to adopt 
a memetic approach in favour of all the alternatives available to the social scientist. 
 
Secondly, Shepherd and McKelvey (2009) identify their study as the first attempt to 
operationalise memes. Bereft of an existing memetic methodology, recent research in genetics 
is used to justify focusing on variation rather than selection but in doing this the existence of 
memes is yet again assumed before the analysis stage of the work and stated as 
unsubstantiated fact.  
 
“Memes, like genes, vary and are selectively retained.” (Shepherd and 
McKelvey 2009, p38) 
 
Subsequently, there are serious contradictions regarding the nature of the evolutionary 
algorithm. It is first suggested that only variation in culture is blind, then the whole variation, 
selection, retention process is referred to as blind and then later it is suggested that variation 
can be consciously managed by people which, in turn, implies agency. 
 
To make the assumption of memes work, a choice from all the available definitions 
has to be declared and Dennett‟s (2006) definition of memes as independent knowledge based 
units of meaning that can be chosen or transmitted with more or less accurate transfer with or 
without alteration of meaning, is adopted by Shepherd and McKelvey (ibid) from the range of 
definitions available. However, there is no discussion of the justification for this choice of 
definition over the others which are available and later support for the methodology employed 
is invoked from writers whose definition of memes varies from Dennett‟s, e.g. Blackmore 
(1999) who would disagree with „chosen‟ in terms of the implied free choice. 
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As a result of the above inconsistencies the sampling method used is deployed 
assuming objectivity of the observer at the same time as a theory laden sampling technique is 
proposed. Similarly, the analysis suffers from a similar dualism because memes are located by 
interpreting participants meaning in language. Subsequently, the results fail to address 
replication due to the assumption of memes existing in the data and the hesitation concerning 
agency. Therefore, the work cannot claim to be memetic. In fact, the appeals to content 
analysis and grounded theory, which is inappropriate because no theory is generated, only 
highlight how little the apparently memetic method adds to more mainstream social science 
methods. 
 
Reasons for Thinking about a Narrative Approach to Methodology 
 
Whilst reviewing the literature which is commented upon above there is, despite the 
variation in the theories, a recurring theme which seems to offer a link to more established 
social science methodology. The link is stories/narrative and storytelling. 
 
Blackmore (1999) struggles to maintain a theory wholly dependent on imitation and 
overtly expands the definition of imitation to include reading, writing and direct instruction, 
and storytelling. Blackmore also makes use of examples of storytelling to illustrate memetic 
transmission, for example, urban myths, alien abductions and near death experiences. 
 
“Millions of people tell millions of stories everyday but most are completely 
forgotten. Only a few achieve urban myth status.” (Blackmore, 1999, p15) 
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Dennett (1996) later compliments his narrative centre of gravity theory of 
consciousness by suggesting a macro perspective of how narrative is deployed in the social 
world by people as a way of navigating the social landscape. It is suggested we then use a 
small stock of stories as narrative schemata, with which we anticipate future events and model 
how to behave. The concept of schemata provides links to complexity theory, for example 
Gell-Mann (1994), where schemata are the manifestations of the complexity generated by 
evolving systems. This hierarchy of narrative effects, i.e. within brain and between people, is 
mirrored in Aunger‟s (2002) description of neuromemes, which replicate in a single brain and 
their „signals‟ which instigate a replica in another brain. Aunger (ibid) also suggests people 
use life stories to create permanence from the constant flux of memetic activity but the idea of 
narrative is not developed further. Pratchett, Stewart and Cohen (2002) also develop a link 
between memes and narratives at an interpersonal level by suggesting that humans have 
evolved to use mental models which are based on stories. They even adopt the format of a 
novel to tell their own story of the theory, where humans are characterised as Pan narrans, the 
story telling chimpanzee. Unfortunately, they reserve an unsubstantiated place for human 
agency by suggesting that memes are attractive to minds rather than brains and don't develop 
storytelling into a narrative methodology. Of course, the suggestion that narrative is an 
important mode of knowing is not new to social scientists familiar with narrative studies, for 
example, Czarniawska (2004) links the narrative mode of knowing to innate evolved 
tendencies in humans, characterising humans as Homo narrans, the story telling hominid.  
 
So, a narrative approach to memetics seems to me to be a worthwhile venture when 
compared to the current state of the discipline. The connection between memes and narrative 
has not been expressed in a form which will immediately enable empirical research but 
interestingly, a suggested approach can be found in Dawkins' original theorising. Dawkins 
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(1999a) suggests that without the knowledge of specific genes their effects can still be studied 
by investigating the strategies, averaged across the individuals that use them. The strategies 
can be operationalised by writing them down in English, i.e. a narrative account.  
 
“Instead of comparing the success of individual organisms, it is often in practice 
more useful to compare the success of strategies or programs, or subroutines averaged 
across the individuals that use them.” (Dawkins, 1999a, p118) 
 
Here is the clue which could help to open up the study of replicators in culture in a 
way which justifiably links memetics to genetics via a parallel study of replicators rather than 
an analogy to the gene. In doing so, and if replication can be discovered, an approach which is 
amenable to large numbers of researchers in the social sciences will be justified.  
 
In turn, support for such an approach can be found in complexity science. Gell-Mann 
(1994) posits the Complex Adaptive System as the process by which 'effective complexity'4, 
emerges and cites both biological evolution and culture as the complex products of such 
systems. When a complex adaptive system (possibly an observing person) encounters data, a 
schema is developed which constitutes the rules for reacting in that environment and Gell-
Mann (ibid) suggests schemata are selected in light of the feedback encountered. Importantly, 
the complexity in a schema should be recorded and measured by writing down, in English, the 
regularities which are embodied in it. The congruence of the perspectives outlined above is 
shown in figure 3. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                          
4
 Effective complexity is the order observed by a complex adaptive system excluding data which has not been 
incorporated as order. 
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If Dawkins' vision of a cultural replicator suitably able to cut the gene down to size is 
to be realised then perhaps a clue to how to proceed towards finding examples of such a 
replicator can be found in returning to the core characteristics of replicators. The empirical 
work on memes should focus, in the first place, on identifying instances of replication in 
culture. Until examples of memes can be found, memetics will remain an impotent body of 
knowledge and speculation. The biological/genetic baggage must be stripped away from 
memetics so subjects, such as the possibility of memetic replicating machinery, including 
memes as viruses, or the assumption of replicator based heredity in religions, can be safely 
shelved for the time being.  
 
An intuitive liking, such as my own, for genetic theory is not sufficient justification 
for carrying forward genetic theory into culture but intuition is a good source of the 
motivation needed for sustaining a systematic and rigorous exploration of how culture may 
emerge. If memetics is to be considered a useful addition to the social sciences, which can 
engage questions of culture whilst reflexively recognising its inherent claims to the nature of 
epistemology and ontology, then a feasible and justifiable methodology for empirical research 
should be adopted. The candidate I propose for this role is narrative analysis. The key factors 
underpinning my proposal are: 
 
 The seemingly unavoidable references to stories/storytelling and narrative which 
appear in the literature. 
 The narrative orientated accounts of self and consciousness which show how units of 
culture could be conceived. 
 The suggestion of written (narrative) accounts to illustrate replicator strategies 
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 The link between narrative accounts and measures of effective complexity 
 The body of knowledge concerning narrative research is well developed and provides 
a rigorous approach to research which does not presume memes' existence but 
acknowledges potential links to innate ways of knowing. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Memes occur as the 
product of imitation and 
replicate independently 
of genes 
Behaviour occurs based 
on imitation 
Genetic selection 
evolves a brain which 
allows humans to 
imitate each other 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The stream of (maybe 
internally) verbalised 
information is experienced 
as consciousness 
Pieces of information 
within the parallel 
environment compete to 
be verbalised (memes) 
Genetic selection evolves a 
parallel processing brain 
29 
 
 
Figure 3 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1 Dawkins' version of how memes arose, adapted from Dawkins (1989). A genetically 
evolved ability to imitate led to replicating units of cultural information which then began 
their own process of evolution. 
 
Figure 2 Dennett's view of the memetic process by which humans experience consciousness, 
adapted from Dennett (1991). Consciousness is the product of the retrospective experience of 
our parallel processing brains. 
 
Figure 3 The congruence of ideas which suggest a narrative approach to memetics. 
 
 
 
